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This two-part article discusses the constitutional right to a
speedy trial and the basics of the speedy trial statute.
he right to a speedy trial is one of
the cornerstones of the American
criminal justice system. The un-
derlying goals of the speedy trial require-
ment are justice and fairness. Both the
public and accused are more likely to get
justice if a dispute is resolved in a timely
fashion, with the innocent exonerated
and the guilty punished. Delay can ham-
per the pursuit ofjustice because memo-
ries may fade and evidence may disap-
pear. The requirement of a speedy trial
also acts as a check on government pow-
er. People cannot be held in custody in-
definitely; the government must provide
the accused with his or her day in court
in a timely fashion.
The right to a speedy trial is a person-
al and fundamental right. The Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; §
16, Article II, of the Colorado Constitu-
tion; Colorado Revised Statutes ("CRS")
§ 18-5-401; and Colorado Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure ("C.R.Crim.P") 48 all guar-
antee criminal defendants a speedy tri-
al. The Colorado statute and rule are
premised on constitutional guarantees
and are intended to render them more
effective. Failure to comply with speedy
trial requirements results in the dismis-
sal of charges.
The purpose of this two-part article is
to review the constitutional and statuto-
ry right to a speedy trial, and to discuss
the case law interpreting that right. Pros-
ecutors, defense counsel, and judges all
have roles to play in ensuring that the
right to a speedy trial is enforced.
This Part I discusses the constitution-
al right to a speedy trial and begins the
discussion of the statutory right, cover-
ing the topics of the rule itself and the ex-
tension, waiver, and tolling of the statu-
tory right. Part II, to be published in the
August 2002 issue, will address other is-
sues that arise under the speedy trial
statute, including delays caused by ap-
pellate proceedings, the interaction be-
tween the right to a speedy trial and the
right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel, and delays that are attributable to ac-
tions by the prosecution or the court.
The Constitutional Right
To a Speedy Trial
The U.S. and Colorado Constitutions
contain virtually identical speedy trial
provisions. The Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides in relevant
part: "In all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial.. . . Section 16, Article
II, of the Colorado Constitution provides
in relevant part: "In criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to ... a
speedy public trial.. ." Thus, the analy-
sis of speedy trial issues under the U.S.
and Colorado Constitutions is the same.'
A defendant who believes his or her
constitutional right to a speedy trial has
been violated must raise the issue prior
to the commencement of trial.2 Failure
to raise an objection prior to the com-
mencement of trial constitutes a waiver
of the constitutional right to speedy tri-
al.3 It is the defendant's burden to estab-
lish that the constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated.
4
The defendant's constitutional speedy
trial right starts to run from the date the
defendant falls into the status of"an ac-
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cused."15 A defendant has been "accused,"
and the constitutional right to a speedy
trial attaches, once the defendant is for-
mally accused by a charging document,
such as a criminal complaint. 6 (As dis-
cussed below, the statutory right to a
speedy trial starts to run at the time of ar-
raignment.) The constitutional right to a
speedy trial has no set time period within
which a trial must occur. Accordingly, the
determination of whether a defendant's
constitutional speedy trial right has been
violated must be made on a case-by-case
basis.
7
The Four Factors in the
Constitutional Analysis
There are four factors, none of which is
dispositive,8 that a trial court should con-
sider in resolving the defendant's motion
to dismiss based on the constitutional right
to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the de-
lay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) it and
when, the defendant asserted a demand
for a speedy trial; and (4) whether the de-
lay has caused prejudice to the defendant.9
The Length of the Delay: The U.S.
and Colorado Constitutions do not guar-
antee a trial immediately on apprehen-
sion.10 Instead, the Constitutions guaran-
tee a trial that is both speedy and consis-
tent with the courtes business.1 No specific
time period resolves the speedy trial ques-
tion; whether a specific delay violates a
defendant's constitutional rights depends
on the facts of each case. 12
The Reasons for the Delay: Where
the delay is attributable, either in whole
or in part, to the defendant, appellate
courts are more likely to find that the con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial has not
been denied.13 Conversely, when the delay
is not attributable to the defendant, and
particularly when the delay is attributa-
ble to the prosecution, appellate courts are
more likely to find that there has been a
violation of the constitutional right to a
speedy trial.14
The Timeliness of Defendant's De-
mand: A defendant who demands a
speedy trial early and often in the course
of the proceedings is much more likely to
gain a sympathetic appellate ear. When
the defendant does not object to a trial
date or seek an earlier date and, instead,
requests an even later date, such actions
have been held to constitute a waiver of
the defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial.15
Even a delay in the assertion of the con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial may con-
stitute a waiver of that right. The Colora-
do Supreme Court has held that the "de-
fendants' delay in asserting their right to
a speedy trial is entitled to strong eviden-
tiary weight in determining whether the
defendants were denied their constitution-
al right to a speedy trial."16 The Court also
has held that a "failure to assert the right
will make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial."
17
In any event, the defendant must raise the
issue of speedy trial prior to the commence-
ment of trial or the objection is waived.18
Prejudice to the Defendant: Preju-
dice will not be presumed when the delay
has not been shown to be arbitrary or op-
pressive19 nor will prejudice be presumed
solely from the length of the delay Actual
prejudice must be shown by the defen-
dant.20 What constitutes prejudice de-
pends on the facts of the particular case.
Usually, prejudice arises in the form of
something that hampers the defendant's
ability to present his or her case; for exam-
ple, the disappearance ofwitnesses and ev-
idence and the fading of memories. 21 Prej-
udice also may arise from the deprivation
of liberty, loss of employment and finan-
cial resources, personal and family anxi-
ety, social obloquy, and the public oppro-
brium that often accompanies the exis-




To a Speedy Trial
A defendant also may move to dismiss
charges based on a violation of the statu-
tory right to a speedy trial found in CRS §
18-1-405 and C.R.Crim.P 48. The Colora-
do appellate courts have consistently con-
sidered the statute and rule interchange-
ably.23 While the statute and rule are de-
signed to implement the constitutional
guarantees, compliance with the statuto-
ry requirements does not automatically
satisfy constitutional demands.24
The statute puts the burden on the court
and prosecution to bring the defendant to
trial within six months of the date the de-
fendant enters a plea of not guilty. The stat-
ute places on the defendant the burden of
objecting to a setting that is outside the
statutory speedy trial limit. A dismissal
due to a violation of the statute bars any
further prosecution based on acts arising
out of the same criminal episode. The stat-
utory time period may be extended by op-
eration of law and may be tolled by vari-
ous actions of the defendant.
As previously stated, the statutory right
to a speedy trial requires the court and
prosecution to bring a defendant to trial
within six months of the date the defen-
dant enters a plea of not guilty. The initial
application of this rule is fairly simple and
straightforward. The beginning date is the
date a defendant enters a plea of not guilty.
The ending date is the date the case is
brought to trial. A defendant is "brought
to trial" when the court calls the case, coun-
sel indicate they are ready to proceed with
trial, and trial commences. For purposes
of the statutory speedy trial right, trial
commences when jury selection begins,




Historically, it was occasionally quite dif-
ficult to determine whether a defendant
had waived the statutory right to a speedy
trial or whether the time limit had been
extended by operation of law or actions of
the parties. Sometimes, it still is. Howev-
er, to reduce the confusion surrounding
this determination, CRS § 18-1-405(5.1)
requires defense counsel to expressly ob-
ject to a trial setting that counsel believes
is outside of the statutory speedy trial time
frame. If counsel fails to object to the set-
ting at the time it is offered, the statutory
speedy trial right is automatically extend-
ed to the date set for trial. This provision
does not apply to defendants who appear
pro se.26 Additionally, a defendant must
move for dismissal based on a violation of
the statutory right to speedy trial either
prior to the commencement of the trial or
prior to the entry of a plea of guilty. Fail-
ure to so move waives the defendant's right
to claim a violation of the statutory right
to a speedy trial.
21
Although the statute clearly places the
burden on the defendant and defense at-
torney to object to a date beyond speedy
trial, the burden presumably still remains
on the court and prosecution to make sure
there is a record an appellate court can re-
view to determine whether the defendant
or defense counsel objected to the proposed
trial date.28 In Fisher v. County Court,
29
the trial date was set with a clerk in the
clerk's office, and not on the record. The
defendant and defendant's counsel claimed
they voiced an objection to the clerk, but
did not go back into the court to place the
objection on the record. The Colorado
Court of Appeals held that the burden was
on the trial court and the prosecution to
make an appropriate record, and that the
defendant's motion to dismiss should have
been granted.
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Extension of the Statutory
Right to a Speedy Trial
The speedy trial statute provides that a
number of events trigger an extension of
the six-month time period within which a
defendant must be brought to trial. Those
events include a request for a continuance
by the defendant,30 a failure to appear by
the defendant at trial,31 and the defen-
dant's consent to a request for a continu-
ance. 32 The first two of these extensions
are for six months. This means that a de-
fendant's request for a continuance extends
the statutory speedy trial time by six
months from the date of the request; a fail-
ure to appear for trial extends the period
for six months from the date on which the
defendant does appear. The length of the
third extension is the length of time be-
tween the granting of the prosecution's re-
quest for continuance or the waiver by the
defendant and the new date to which the
trial is continued.
CRS § 18-1-405 further provides that
certain periods of time are excluded alto-
gether from the calculation of the statuto-
ry right to a speedy trial, with the obvious
net effect of extending the statutory speedy
trial time period. These periods include
certain specified periods of time related to
mental health evaluations and competen-
cy; interlocutory appeals, mistrials, and
changes of venue; voluntary absences and
other delays by the defendant; efforts by
the prosecution to secure evidence; and the
time needed for re-setting of trial after
these sorts of delays.
Properly considered, these subsections
of the speedy trial statute "toll" the statute.
In some appellate decisions, the terms "toll"
and "waive" are used interchangeably, but
the Colorado Supreme Court has noted
33
that the term "Waive" should apply only to
those events that cause a new six-month
period to begin (for example, a defendant's
request for a continuance),34 while "toll" ap-
plies to those situations that suspend the
running of the speedy trial clock for some
specified period of time (for example, the
period of time that a defendant is incom-
petent).
35
The Colorado appellate courts have ad-
dressed issues relating to the tolling or
waiving of the speedy trial statute. The
next two sections address these cases.
Waiver of the Statutory
Right to a Speedy Trial
It is well settled that a defendant can
waive the statutory right to a speedy trial
and that such a waiver may be either ex-
press or implied. A failure to demand dis-
missal on speedy trial grounds,36 proceed-
ing to trial without a speedy trial objec-
tion,37 and a failure to raise a speedy trial
claim until appeal38 have all been deemed
to amount to a waiver of the statutory right
to a speedy trial.
The statute now contains an explicit pro-
vision, mentioned above, that a defendant
must object to a trial setting that is outside
the statutory speedy trial time or the de-
fendant will be deemed to have waived any
statutory speedy trial objection.39 That pro-
vision requires not only that defendant's
objection must precede the commence-
ment of trial, but also that the objection
must precede the commencement of any
pretrial motions set for hearing immedi-
ately before trial or the entry of a plea of
guilty.
Certain other actions of the defendant
are deemed, by statute or case law, to con-
stitute a waiver of the statutory right to a
speedy trial (thus, starting a new six-
month period within which to bring the
defendant to trial). One recurring issue is
a failure of the defendant to appear for tri-
al. Historically, if a defendant failed to ap-
pear for trial, the speedy trial period was
extended by the length of time the defen-
dant remained at large, plus a reasonable
length of time to get the defendant re-
scheduled on the court's calendar.4 0 The
speedy trial statute now specifically pro-
vides that if a defendant fails to appear for
trial, the speedy trial period begins to run
anew when the defendant reappears in
court.
4 1
Similarly, the statute explicitly provides
that, once a trial date has been set, a de-
fendant who requests a continuance
waives speedy trial. On the granting of
such a request, a new six-month period be-
gins to run from the date on which the con-
tinuance was granted.42 If a trial date has
not been set and the defendant requests a
continuance, the analysis is different; this
situation is analyzed in the section below
on tolling of the statute.
If the defendant fails to appear for some
hearing other than trial, the statute ex-
cludes from speedy trial calculations "the
period of delay resulting from the volun-
tary absence or unavailability of defen-
dant."" The statute goes on to provide that
"a defendant shall be considered unavail-
able whenever his whereabouts are known
but his presence for trial cannot be ob-
tained, or he resists being returned to the
state for trial."44 In interpreting this pro-
vision, the courts have applied it when the
defendant simply failed to appear,4" as well
as when the defendant's whereabouts are
known but his or her presence cannot be
obtained for trial.46
The fact that a defendant is incarcerat-
ed in another jurisdiction outside the state
does not make him or her unavailable for
purposes of speedy trial calculations, un-
less the prosecution can show that it is un-
able to obtain the defendant's presence
despite diligent efforts.47 A defendant in
custody in a foreign jurisdiction does not
forfeit the right to a speedy trial, and the
prosecution still has a duty to make a dili-
gent good-faith effort to bring the defen-
dant to trial.48 This is particularly true
when the defendant is in the custody of
that foreign jurisdiction and because a Col-
orado Governor's warrant can authorize
the extradition of the defendant from that
jurisdiction.
49
The amount of time excluded from the
statutory speedy trial calculation due to
defendant's absence or unavailability is not
limited to the actual time of such absence
or unavailability. The exclusion applies to
all delay "resulting from" such absence.
50
Accordingly, once the defendant is located
or becomes available, the court and pros-
ecution are also permitted an additional
reasonable time to get the trial set on the
court's docket and to prepare the case for
trial.51 What constitutes a "reasonable
time" must be determined on a case-by-
case basis, considering such factors as the
difficulty in locating witnesses, problems
with overcrowded dockets, and the goal of
discouraging defendants who run time off
the speedy trial period and then abscond
from the state.52
Tolling of the Statutory
Right to a Speedy Trial
If the prosecution requests a continu-
ance of the trial and the defendant or de-
fense counsel waive speedy trial in open
court, or if a written waiver of speedy trial
is signed by the defendant and filed with
the court, the period of speedy trial is tolled
for the length of time between the grant-
ing of the continuance and the new trial
date. The statutory right is thus extended
by that period of time.
53
If a trial date has not been set, and the
defendant requests a continuance, the re-
sulting period of delay is attributed to the
defendant and generally operates to ex-
tend the speedy trial period.54 However,
the Colorado Court of Appeals has held
that this time period should not be exclud-
ed from the speedy trial calculation unless
the continuance actually affects the trial
The Colorado Lawyer / July 2002 / Vol. 31, No. 7 / 117
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date.55 Thus, in this case, the defendant's
motion to continue the pretrial conference,
before a trial date had even been set, did
not extend the speedy trial limit.
Conclusion
Part I of this two-part article has provid-
ed an overview of the constitutional right
to a speedy trial and an introduction to the
statutory right to a speedy trial. The con-
stitutional right-as is frequently the case
with constitutional law-is bounded by
broad statements of principles, while the
statutory right is much more specifically
tailored to the everyday needs of criminal
prosecutors, defenders, and judges. All par-
ties must consider both the statute and
the constitution when evaluating speedy
trial questions. The second part of this ar-
ticle will address a number of issues that
frequently arise in the interpretation of
the statutory right.
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